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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-
3(j) . 
ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue Presented: Does the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel and/or Utah's Liability Reform Act preclude multiple and 
successive adjudications against different defendants on the cause 
of the same damage? 
Standard of Review: The issue presented for review is a 
legal determination and is reviewed for correctness. Cook v. Zions 
First Ntof 1 . 919 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah Court App. 1995), cert, denied, 
925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The provisions of Utah's Liability Reform Act, Utah Code 
Ann. §78-27-37 et seq, are determinative of this appeal and they 
are reproduced in Addendum 1. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Course of Proceeding 
Appellant Syrett Corporation ("Syrett") implies in the 
Nature of The Case portion of their Brief that only claims of 
common law fraud and violations of federal and state securities 
laws were asserted in a prior federal action. However, Syrett also 
asserted legal malpractice claims in that action. (R. 171-172.) 
Syrett commenced the current action against Appellees 
Paul H. Shaphren and Parsons & Crowther ("Shaphren") alleging 
Shaphren committed legal malpractice in representing Syrett in 
connection with a stock offering transaction. The damages Syrett 
claims were caused by Shaphren's conduct are the same damages 
Syrett alleged and proved in a prior federal action were entirely 
caused by others.(R.212-14.) 
Shaphren moved for summary judgment on grounds that 
collateral estoppel and Utah's Liability Reform Act preclude a 
second and separate adjudication of the cause of the damages Syrett 
proved in the prior federal action were caused by others. The 
District Court granted Shaphren's motion concluding collateral 
estoppel barred the relitigation of the cause of Syrett's damages 
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and that Shaphren's fault could and should have been adjudicated 
and apportioned in the prior federal action. (R. 523.25.)1 
B. Statement of Facts 
PRIOR ADJUDICATION 
In June 1990 Syrett asserted counterclaims and a third-
party complaint against Frank B. Venuti and entities controlled by 
him ("Venuti") and John R. Riley ("Riley") in a federal action 
entitled Automobile Assurance Financial Corp. v. Syrett Corp./ et 
al., Civil No. 90-6-2245 (the "Prior Adjudication"). 
The Prior Adjudication arose out of a stock offering 
transaction proposed to Syrett by Venuti. Syrett alleged Venuti 
represented that the stock offering transaction would be highly 
successful, risk free, that Venuti would incur all expenses related 
to the stock offering and that he would receive compensation of 
100,000 shares of Syrett stock only if the stock offering raised at 
least $10,000,000. Despite these representations, the stock 
offering failed to raise any money. Nevertheless, Venuti refused 
This ruling can be affirmed based upon either or both collateral estoppel 
and the recognition of a "'one action rule" under the Liability Reform Act. K&T, 
Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 628 (Utah 1994) (Appellate Court "may affirm a 
grant of summary judgment on any ground, even when not relied upon by the trial 
court"). 
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to return 100,000 shares of Syrett's stock that had been 
transferred to him as compensation for the stock offering. (R.133-
36) . 
The relief sought by Syrett was: (a) the return of the 
100,000 shares of its stock; (2) franchise taxes Syrett had paid in 
connection with a reincorporation of it as a Delaware Corporation 
at the urging of Venuti; and its attorney fees incurred in the 
Prior Adjudication. (R. 135) . 
Syrett asserted causes of action against Venuti based 
upon misrepresentation, breach of contract, fraud and breach of 
federal and state securities laws. (R. 158-76). Syrett alleged 
Riley was its attorney at the time of the stock offering 
transaction and that Riley breached professional duties owed to 
Syrett as their attorney by failing to disclose conflicts of 
interest, failing to protect Syrettfs interests in the stock 
offering transaction and breaching his duty to exercise undivided 
loyalty and due care to protect Syrett. (R. 158-76.) 
At the conclusion of trial the court found that Venuti 
had made misrepresentations in connection with the stock offering 
transaction, structured an offering that was not viable and was 
unmarketable, violated federal and state securities laws and 
wrongfully retained 100,000 shares of Syrettes stock. (R.195-200). 
4 
The court found Riley breached duties owed to Syrett as 
their attorney by failing to explain to Syrett the legal 
significance of documents he requested they sign, failing to 
disclose that Venuti claimed an unconditional right to the 100,000 
shares of Syrett's stock and failing to disclose conflicts of 
interest which prevented him from giving competent legal advice, 
(R. 191-193, 200-202.) The court also found that Riley aided and 
abetted Venuti in fraudulently obtaining the 100,000 shares of 
Syrett stock in violation of federal and state securities laws. 
The court stated this violation of securities laws was the basis 
for holding Riley jointly and severally liable with Venuti for the 
attorney fees and costs incurred by Syrett in the Prior 
Adjudication. (R.203.) 
The court awarded Syrett all the relief it sought: (1) 
the court ordered the return of the 100,000 shares of Syrett stock; 
(2)awarded Syrett $43,000 representing Delaware franchise taxes 
incurred in connection with the reincorporation of Syrett into a 
Delaware corporation; and (3) awarded Syrett its attorney fees and 
costs incurred in the prior adjudication. (R. 202-03.) 
5 
CURRENT ACTION 
In the current action Syrett alleges Shaphren breached 
professional duties owed to Syrett as its attorney by failing to 
disclose conflicts of interest, making negligent false 
representations regarding the stock offering transaction and 
otherwise breaching the duty of care owed to Syrett. (R.3-4, 6, 9-
11.) 
At the time of the stock offering Syrett knew Shaphren 
had prepared a private placement memorandum in connection with the 
stock offering, and believed Shaphren was its attorney and 
represented Syrett in the stock offering transaction. (R. 3-6, 
138) . 
Syrett acknowledges the damages it now claims were caused 
by Shaphren are the same damages the court in the Prior 
Adjudication found were caused entirely by Riley and Venuti: (1) 
$43,000 in Delaware franchise taxes paid by Syrett; and (2) the 
attorney fees and costs incurred by Syrett in the Prior 
Adjudication. (Syrettfs Appellate Brief, p.7; R. 212-14). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Doctrine of Collateral Estoppel bars multiple and 
successive adjudications against different defendants of the 
proximate cause of the same damage. Accordingly, Syrettes current 
action against Shaphren to recover damages previously adjudicated 
to have been caused by others is barred. 
Also, Utah's Liability Reform Act requires that the 
adjudication and allocation of fault proximately causing damage 
take place in one action in order to avoid multiple and 
inconsistent adjudications on proximate cause and to prevent an 
allocation of liability that exceeds fault. Accordingly, the 
current action which seeks a second adjudication on whose fault 
proximately caused damages, the cause of which have already been 
adjudicated, is barred by the Liability Reform Act. 
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ARGUMENT 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL AND/OR UTAH'S LIABILITY REFORM ACT 
BARS A SECOND ADJUDICATION OF THE CAUSE OF DAMAGES 
PREVIOUSLY ADJUDICATED TO HAVE BEEN CAUSED BY OTHERS 
AND THEREFORE SYRETT'S CLAIMS AGAINST SHAPHREN ARE BARRED 
A. SYRETT'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL 
The doctrine of res judicata provides that the final 
adjudication of a claim or of a particular issue is binding on the 
parties to that adjudication and precludes a subsequent 
adjudication of the same claim or issue. Church v. Meadow Springs 
Ranch Corp., Inc. 659 P.2d 1045, 1058(1983); Penrod v. Nu Creation 
Creme, Inc., 669 P.2d 873, 875 (Utah 1983). There are two branches 
of res judicata: claim preclusion and collateral estoppel (also 
known as issue preclusion). While "both branches basically serve 
the important judicial policy, among others, of preventing issues 
once litigated from being relitigated . . ." they have distinct 
applications. Whereas claim preclusion bars a party's claims 
previously litigated, collateral estoppel prevents the relitigation 
of issues that have been once litigated and determined in another 
action even though the claims for relief in the two actions may be 
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different. Penrod, 669 P.2d at 875; Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 
433, 442 (Utah 1996). 
It cannot be questioned that multiple and successive 
adjudications against different defendants on the proximate cause 
of the same damage is exactly what collateral estoppel precludes. 
The elements of collateral estoppel are: 
1. The issue in both cases is the same; 
2. The party who is precluded from litigating the issue 
must be either a party to the first action or a privy of a party; 
3. The prior litigation must have resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits; and 
4. The issue was fully and fairly litigated. 
Id; Estate of Covington v. Josephson, 888 P.2d 675, 677 (Utah Ct. 
App.1992). 
1. The Issue To Which Collateral Estoppel Applies Is The 
Same In the Prior Adjudication as in the Current Action. 
The issue to which collateral estoppel applies is the 
proximate cause of Syrettfs damages. The damages Syrett sought in 
the Prior Adjudication were: (1) its attorney fees and costs 
incurred in the Prior Adjudication to recover 100,000 shares of its 
stock, and (2) $43,000 in Delaware franchise taxes incurred in 
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connection with the reincorporation of Syrett into a Delaware 
Corporation. 
In the Prior Adjudication Syrett claimed these damages 
were caused by Rileyfs breach of his professional duties owed to 
Syrett as their attorney2 and Riley and Venuti's fraud and 
violation of state and federal securities laws. The trial court 
agreed and entered judgment in favor of Syrett for the amount of 
Delaware franchise taxes incurred by Syrett and Syrett's attorney 
fees and costs incurred in the Prior Adjudication to recover its 
stock. 
Syrett now claims Shaphren's breach of professional 
duties owed to Syrett as its attorney caused Syrett's attorney fees 
and costs incurred in the Prior Adjudication and the $43,000 in 
Delaware franchise taxes. Syrett seeks no other damages from 
Shaphren. Accordingly, the issue in both cases to which collateral 
estoppel applies, the cause of Syrett's damages, is the same. 
Syrett claims the "issue" to which collateral estoppel 
applies is not the same because different theories or claims are 
asserted in the current action from those asserted in the Prior 
2
 The breaches alleged included failure to disclose conflicts of interest, 
failure to protect Syrett's interests in the stock offering and breach of his 
duty to exercise undivided loyalty and due care to protect Syrett. 
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Adjudication. However, it is immaterial whether different theories 
or claims are asserted in the second adjudication. "Collateral 
estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents the relitigation of issues 
that have been once litigated and determined in another action even 
though the claims for relief in the two actions may be different." 
Penrod, 669 P.2d at 8753 (emphasis added); Harline, 912 P.2d at 
442. Logically, then, the barring of the relitigation of a 
particular issue under collateral estoppel may have the practical 
effect of barring the litigation of entire claims. See Alaska 
Foods v. Nichiro Gyocryo Kaisha, 769 P.2d 117, 123,n.6 (Ala. 1989). 
Because the only damages Syrett seeks in this case are those 
adjudicated to have been caused by others, by barring the 
relitigation of who caused those damages, collateral estoppel has 
the effect of barring Syrett's claims against Shaphren. 
In its brief, Syrett incorrectly cites Penrod for the proposition that 
collateral estoppel does not apply where different theories of recovery are 
asserted. While Penrod discussed both collateral estoppel and claim preclusion, 
the court only applied claim preclusion. The statement in Penrod relied upon by 
Syrett for the proposition that different theories of recovery are relevant in 
the application of res judicata were made in connection with the court's 
application claim preclusion, not collateral estoppel. Penrod, 669 P. 2d at 875-
77. 
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2. The Privity Requirement is Satisfied. 
It is undisputed the party against whom Shaphren invokes 
collateral estoppel, Syrett, was a party in the Prior Adjudication. 
3. The Prior Adjudication Resulted in a Final Judgment on 
the Merits and Was Fully and Fairly Litigated. 
The Prior Adjudication resulted in a final judgment on 
the merits. The issue of the cause of Syrett's damages was also 
fully and fairly litigated in the prior adjudication. 
Syrett's claim that it had little knowledge or incentive 
to litigate Shaphren's fault until Shaphren's testimony at trial is 
not convincing. It is undisputed Syrett knew when it commenced the 
Prior Adjudication that Shaphren had prepared a private placement 
memorandum in connection with the stock offering and believed 
Shaphren represented it in the stock offering. (Plaintiff's 
Complaint, 11 8-9, 18; R. 3-6, 138). If Shaphren had refused to 
talk to Syrett's counsel prior to trial as claimed by Syrett, 
Syrett could have subpoenaed and deposed Shaphren if it felt it was 
warranted. The preclusive effect of collateral estoppel is not 
avoided simply because Shaphren may have refused to talk to 
Syrett's counsel before trial. 
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4. Other Jurisdictions Have Recognized That Collateral 
Estoppel Precludes Multiple Adjudications of Proximate 
Cause. 
The case of Waggoner v. General Motors Corp., 771 P.2d 
1195 (Wyo.1989) is a good example of the proper application of 
collateral estoppel in a case similar to this. Waggoner held that 
an adjudication of negligence claims arising from a two vehicle 
collision which determined that a non-party driver's negligence was 
the cause of the accident collaterally estopped plaintiff from 
maintaining in a subsequent proceeding warranty and strict 
liability claims against the automobile dealer which had lent 
plaintiff the vehicle. The Waggoner court stated: 
In accordance with the aforementioned cases, 
we conclude that the doctrine of collateral 
estoppel by judgment is an appropriate basis 
upon which to affirm the district court's 
grant of summary judgment on appellant's 
strict liability and warranty claims. The 
jury, by its verdict in this case, clearly 
determined that Elizabeth Fielder's negligent 
running through a stop sign was the entire 
proximate cause of the accident. Proximate 
cause is as necessary under warranty and 
strict liability causes of action as it is in 
a negligence action. [citations omitted]. 
Here, the fact question of proximate cause, or 
more precisely *cause in fact" was determined 
against appellant in the trial of his 
negligence claim. 
Id. at 1204. (emphasis added) 
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Similarly, Gossaae v. Roberts, 904 S.W.2d 246 (KY 
Ct.App.1995) held that plaintiff was collaterally estopped by 
virtue of his prior criminal conviction for assault from 
relitigating in a subsequent malpractice action against his 
physician the issue of causation for damages caused by plaintiff's 
incarceration. Plaintiff alleged the physician's negligence in 
prescribing Prozac and Xanax without proper supervision resulted in 
involuntary acts which produced the violent acts resulting in his 
conviction. However, the jury in plaintiff's prior criminal case 
concluded plaintiff's conduct was intentional. The court held, 
therefore, that plaintiff's incarceration was caused by plaintiff's 
intentional acts and plaintiff was collaterally estopped from 
relitigating the cause of his damages, i.e., from claiming 
another's negligent conduct caused his damages. 
The cases addressing collateral estoppel cited by Syrett 
are either distinguishable or incorrect applications of collateral 
estoppel. Monaeau v. Boutelle, 407 N.E.2d 352(MA.Ct.App.1980) is 
distinguishable because the court decided the case applying claim 
preclusion not collateral estoppel.4 The defendant Broker invoking 
Unlike collateral estoppel, claim preclusion requires mutuality of 
privity - - both the party against whom it is being invoked and the party 
invoking it must have been parties or privies of parties in the prior action. 
Penrod, 669 P.2d at 875. 
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claim preclusion argued he was in privity with defendants in the 
prior action against whom claims had been asserted. The court 
found that the Broker was not in privity with those defendants and 
therefore the litigation of the claims against those defendants 
would not preclude the litigation of the claims against the Broker. 
Another significant distinction is that the judgment in 
the prior action in Mongeau did not cover additional relief or 
damages available against the Broker in the second adjudication. 
In the instant case, however, Syrett seeks the same damage, and no 
others, Syrett alleged and proved in the Prior Adjudication were 
caused by Riley and Venuti. 
The case of Noaue v. Estate of Santiago, 540 A.2d 889 
(NJ.Supr.AD 1988) is distinguishable because the court found that 
a "simple" uninsured motorist arbitration cannot produce an 
adjudication with preclusive effect under the doctrine of 
collateral estoppel, stating "the joint UM arbitrations were not 
intended, structured or conducted to resolve, and thus cannot be 
said to have fairly determined, the issue of liability between 
Nogue and Santiago." I&. at 893. 
Both 0'Connor v. State, 512 NYS.2d 536(A.D.3 Dept. 1987) 
and Drescher v. Hoffman Motors Corp.,585 F.Supp. 555(D Conn. 1984) 
misapplied collateral estoppel by defining the "issue" in the case 
15 
as not whether the proximate cause of the Plaintiff's damage had 
been adjudicated but whether the "issue" of a particular 
defendant's cause of Plaintiff's damage had been adjudicated. 
These holdings allow for multiple and successive 
adjudications on the cause of the same damage, the number of which 
would be limited only by the number of defendants against whom 
claims could be brought. Under comparative fault schemes, these 
holdings would also allow for more than 100% of the fault for 
particular damage to be adjudicated. 
The dissenting opinion in O'Connor, joined by three 
justices, recognized the majority's error in improperly defining 
the "issue" to which collateral estoppel applied: 
In applying this doctrine [collateral 
estoppel] to the instant case, it is crucial 
to properly identify the issue necessarily 
decided in the first action. 
* * • 
In the instant case, the jury at the first 
trial, assessed culpable conduct of 60% 
against decedent. This finding did not mean 
that, as among the parties in the action (i.e. 
decedent, Sulger and the cycling association 
members) , decedent was 60% at fault for the 
accident. Rather, the verdict means that, 
considering all causative factors, 60% of the 
culpable conduct which caused the accident was 
attributable to the decedent. 
Id. at 541. (emphasis added.) 
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B. UTAH'S LIABILITY REFORM ACT PRECLUDES MULTIPLE 
ADJUDICATIONS AGAINST DIFFERENT DEFENDANTS ON THE ISSUE 
OF WHOSE CONDUCT OR FAULT CAUSED THE SAME DAMAGE. 
1. The Issue of Whose Conduct or Fault Caused Particular 
Damage Must be Adjudicated in One Action. 
Utah's Liability Reform Act, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37, 
et seg., eliminated joint and several liability among joint 
tortfeasors and requires an apportionment of fault among all those 
a plaintiff or defendant claim contributed to plaintiff's damages. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-37-41. 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a primary purpose of 
the Liability Reform Act is to prevent an allocation of liability 
that exceeds fault and that courts must construe the provisions of 
the Liability Reform Act to achieve this purpose. Sullivan v. 
Scoular Grain Co. of Utah, 853 P.2d at 878-880.5 The adjudication 
and apportionment of fault under the Liability Reform Act must take 
The Sullivan Court acknowledged that a person immune from suit did not 
fall within the definition of "defendant" under the Act and that, arguably the 
Act precluded the consideration of any fault of the immune person in apportioning 
fault among defendants. However, the court held that this otherwise reasonable 
interpretation must give way to an interpretation that achieves the legislation's 
primary intent of preventing an allocation of liability that exceeds a 
defendant's fault. 
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place in one action in order for the intent of the act to be 
achieved. 
The current action illustrates how multiple adjudications 
against different defendants as to the cause of the same damage 
frustrates the intent of the Liability Reform Act. The claims 
asserted against Shaphren are negligence claims that do not subject 
him to joint and several liability for Syrettes damages.6 However, 
the prior adjudication that Riley and Venuti's fault entirely 
caused Syrett's damages precludes a relitigation of their fault for 
purposes of determining Shaphren's proportionate share of fault, if 
any, in causing Syrettes damages - - there is only 100% fault to be 
apportioned. Consequently, this second adjudication exposes 
Shaphren to liability for all of Syrett's damages regardless of 
whether his fault in causing these damages is actually minuscule as 
compared to Riley's and Venuti's fault. 
The language of the Liability Reform Act also evidences 
an intent that fault be adjudicated in one action. The act 
The issue of whether joint and several liability among intentional 
tortfeasors remains under the Liability Reform Act has not directly been 
addressed by a Utah appellate court. Other jurisdictions conclude that the fault 
of intentional tortfeasors must be compared with one another where the 
Jurisdiction's Comparative Fault Statutes have eliminated joint and several 
liability and broadly define fault. See. E.G. Brazovick v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 222 
(N.J. 1991). However, this issue need not be resolved or addressed in the 
current action since it is not alleged Shaphren committed intentional torts. 
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expressly limits a defendant to one action to exercise his right to 
reduce his percentage of fault by requesting that the fact finder 
consider the fault of others who may have caused plaintiff's 
damages. A defendant is precluded from seeking contribution from 
any other person in a subsequent action. Utah Code Ann. §28-27-40 
& 41. 
Contrary to Syrettes claim, there is no legal or 
equitable basis for an interpretation of the Lability Reform Act 
that would allow a plaintiff to avoid the consequences of failing 
to assert claims against a potentially liable party. In ruling 
that Kansas' comparative fault statutes require that an 
apportionment of fault take place in one action, the Kansas Supreme 
Court stated: 
Under the doctrine of comparative fault, all 
parties to an occurrence must have their fault 
determined in one action, even though some 
parties cannot be formally joined or held 
legally responsible. Those not joined as 
parties for determination of fault escape 
liability. 
Albertson v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 634 P.2d 1127, 1132 
(Kans.1981). See also Kathios v. General Motors Corp., 862 F.2d 
944, 950 (1st Cir. 1988) ("concerns relating to judicial economy 
also militate against allowing plaintiffs to litigate their cases 
over and over against one defendant at a time.") 
19 
In Mick v. Mani, 766 P.2d 147 (Kans. 1988) Mick sued 
Bethlehem Steel for injuries sustained in a work accident alleging 
strict liability theories. Mick sought damages for pain, loss of 
wages, permanent facial disfigurement and visual disabilities. The 
jury found no fault on the part of Bethlehem Steel, nor, did it 
attribute fault to anyone else. Mick had also commenced a separate 
action against a plastic surgeon for negligent repair of the 
injuries Mick sustained in the work accident. Mick sought recovery 
for pain, loss of wages, permanent facial disfigurement and visual 
disabilities. Id. at 148. 
After judgment in the action against Bethlehem Steel was 
entered the trial court in the medical malpractice action dismissed 
Mick's claims based on the one action rule. In affirming, the 
Kansas Supreme Court held that the comparative fault scheme forbid 
plaintiff from litigating separately against separate defendants 
for the same damage. The court stated: 
In the case in Rooks County [against Bethlehem 
Steel], the jury had before it plaintiff's 
entire claim of damage. It heard the evidence 
and concluded the defendant therein was not at 
fault. This was a determination of comparative 
fault. True, the jury did not have Dr. Mani 
in the action for comparison. Plaintiff 
elected to separate his defendants but not his 
claims of damage. As a result, his entire 
damage claim was presented to the Rooks County 
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jury. When that verdict became final, 
plaintiff's entire damage claim was ended. 
Id- at 156. 
In its brief Syrett argues Mick v. Mani supports the 
proposition that because the court in the Prior Adjudication did 
not apportion fault between Riley and Venuti; but found them 
jointly and severally liable, no comparison of fault has taken 
place and the one action rule therefore does not apply. However, 
Mick v. Mani does not stand for such a proposition. Rather, Mick 
v. Mani, stated that a dismissal with prejudice after settlement or 
otherwise without an adjudication of fault does not bar a 
subsequent action seeking an adjudication of fault. The jury in 
the action against Bethlehem Steel did not apportion fault, it 
simply found Bethlehem Steel not at fault. The court nevertheless 
found that the action against Bethlehem Steel "was a determination 
of comparative fault" precluding a subsequent adjudication of 
fault. Id. at 156. 
2. Shaphren's Fault, if any, Could and Should Have Been 
Apportioned in the Prior Adjudication. 
Syrett contends the Liability Reform Act's "one action 
rule" does not apply because Riley and Venutifs liability for 
21 
Syrett's damages was based upon intentional torts" and the 
Liability Reform Act does not allow for the comparison of 
intentional torts with non-intentional torts. Thus, Syrett is free 
to maintain this second action against Shaphren based on non-
intentional torts. 
If adopted, such a rule would render Shaphren jointly and 
severally liable with Venuti and Riley for all of Syrettfs damages 
even if Shaphren's negligence contributing to those damages was 
minuscule as compared with Riley's and Venuti's fault. Such an 
outcome would entirely frustrate the intent of the Liability Reform 
Act to prevent the allocation of liability that exceeds fault. 
Sullivan, 853 P.2d at 878-80. 
Nor, contrary to Syrett's argument, does the Liability 
Reform Act expressly preclude a comparison of intention tort 
conduct with non-intentional tort conduct. The provisions of the 
Act evidence an intent that such conduct be compared and, in light 
of Sullivan, the Act must be so interpreted. 
This claim is incorrect. In Addition to fraud and Securities Laws 
Claims, Syrett asserted legal malpractice claims against Riley nearly identical 
to those against Shaphren. Syrett alleged Riley failed to disclose conflicts of 
interest, failed to protect Syrett's interest and breached his duties to exercise 
undivided loyalty and protect Syrett. (R. 158-76). Shaphren is alleged to have 
failed to disclose conflicts of interest, made false misrepresentations regarding 
the stock offering and otherwise breached the duty of care owed to Syrett and its 
attorney. (R. 3-4, 6, 9-11). 
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The definition of "fault" in the Liability Reform Act in 
effect at the time Syrett's claim arose reads: 
MFault" means any actionable breach of legal 
duty, act or omission proximately causing or 
contributing to injury or damages . . ., 
including, but not limited to, negligence in 
all areas, contributory negligence, assumption 
of risk, strict liability and misuse, 
modification or abuse of a product. 
Utah Code Ann. §78-27-37 (1992) . This definition of fault 
evidences an intent to include all wrongful conduct within the 
definition of fault. Syrettes claim that an intentional tort is 
not an "act or omission proximately causing or contributing to 
injury or damages" cannot be reconciled with any reasonable and 
logical interpretation of the Liability Reform Act in light of its 
primary intent to ensure that liability does not exceed fault. 
Likewise, Syrettes claim that the Liability Reform Act 
only requires the comparison of "fault based" claims or conduct 
lacks statutory, case law or logical support. The term "fault 
based" is not defined nor does it appear in the Liability Reform 
Act. Nor, is there any case law suggesting the courts are in 
agreement as to what is a "fault based" claim. In fact, a 
statement made by the Utah Supreme Court in Randall v. Allen, 8 62 
P.2d 1329 (Utah 1993) indicates that, strict liability claims are 
not "fault based." The court stated "Except for intentional torts 
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and strict products liability, modern tort law does not impose 
liability for personal injury absent fault or negligence . . ." 
Id. at 1335. (emphasis added.) Since the Liability Reform Act 
expressly requires the comparison of conduct giving rise to strict 
liability claims, Syrett's position is directly contrary to case 
law discussing what is and is not a "fault based " claim. 
Additionally, §78-27-38 requires the fact finder to 
"[c]onsider the conduct of any person who contributed to the 
alleged injury . . . " in determining the proportion of fault of a 
defendant, Utah Code Ann. §78-27-38 (1994) (emphasis added). Thus, 
conduct is to be considered not "fault based" claims. 
Jurisdictions with comparative fault statutes similar to 
Utah's properly recognize that to achieve the intent of comparative 
fault the conduct of non-intention tortfeasors must be compared 
with the fault of intentional tortfeasors. In Natseway v. City of 
Tempe, 909 P.2d 441 (Ariz.App.Div.1 1995) plaintiff sued two cities 
and their police officers for their wrongful handling of a high 
speed chase which resulted in plaintiff's injuries. The plaintiffs 
appealed the trial court's apportionment of fault among the cities, 
their police officers and the fleeing driver, arguing that the 
intentional torts of the fleeing driver cannot be compared with 
those of the other defendants. Arizona's definition of "fault" in 
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its Comparative Fault Statute was virtually identical to the 
defiriiti i ilir I La\ il il heiuiiui > I Th' appellate cuuit 
rejected plaintiff's arguments: 
Despite Tempers duty to prevent Mendoza from 
causing the harm, we believe that to place the 
entire responsibility for the accident on 
Tempe would be inconsistent with the 
principles of comparative fault as embodied in 
the [Comparative Fault Act]. In adopting our 
Comparative Fault scheme, the Legislature 
intended that the trier fact consider the 
fault of all persons who contributed to the 
harm and intended that each tortfeasor be 
"-sponsible for only his or her percentage of 
_ alt and no more, [ci tati on omitted] 
Id. at 443 (emphasis in original). 
In Weidenfeller v. Star & Garter, 2 Ca1. Rptr.2d 14 (Ca1. 
App . Dist. 1991)the plaintiff, who was assaulted in a tavern 
parking lot, alleged that the tavern breached its duty to protect 
.'ij^^ -j: .J an s security. In rejecting 
Plaintiff's argument that intentional conduct cannot be compared 
\ i :i 1 1 i i I : • n - :i n t e n t i o i I a ] c • : n d i l c t 1: h e • :: : • i :i r t :> b s e r ^  T e d: 
According to [plaintiff] the statute has a 
limited effect benefiting a negligent 
tortfeasor only where there are other equally 
culpable defendants, but eliminating that 
benefit where the other tortfeasors act 
intentionally. Stating the proposition 
reflects its absurdity. 
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Id. at 15-16; See also Blazovick v. Andrich, 590 A.2d 
222(N.J.1991); Martin v. U.S.,984 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir.1993); Barth 
v. Coleman, 878 P.2d 319 (N.M.1994). 
Finally, contrary to Syrett's claim, any difficulty in 
comparing conduct deemed intentional or otherwise giving rise to 
joint and several liability with negligent or non-intentional 
conduct does not preclude a comparison of that conduct under the 
Liability Reform Act. Fact finders in Utah are regularly expected 
to compare conduct and apportion fault based upon different kinds 
of conduct with different levels of culpability. Utah Code Ann. 
§78-27-37. .See also Weidenfeller, 2 Cal. Rptr.2d at 17 where in 
responding to the argument that a jury would have difficulty 
comparing intentional tort conduct with negligent conduct, the 
court noted that it was no more difficult than comparing strict 
liability with negligent conduct. 
Shaphren's conduct could and should have been compared 
with Riley's and Venuti's for purposes of determining Shaphren's 
proportionate fault in causing Syrett's damages, whether or not 
Riley and Venuti remained jointly and severally liable based upon 
intentional torts or breach of securities laws. The District Court 
properly recognized that Shaphren's fault could and should have 
been adjudicated and apportioned in the Prior Adjudication. Utah's 
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Liability Reform Act precludes any subsequent adjudication and 
a p p o r t i o n m e n t D f f c i :i 1 t f • : • :i : t: 1 : = • c a i 1 s e ! : • f d a m ages p r e v i o u sly 
adjudicated to have been caused by Riley and Venuti. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Shaphren respectfi 1 ] 1 ] i requests 
that this Court affirm the District Court's grant of Summary 
Judgment in favor of Shaphren and against Syrett. 
T FOR ORAL ARGUMENT 
Shaphren believes oral argument will be beneficial to the 
understanding and resolution of the issue on appeal and therefore 
r e qu e s t s o r a J a. r g urne i i f:. 
DATED this jf_ day of September, 1997. 
KTPP AMD rHPTcTT»N ^ ~. 
CARMAN E. KIPP 
KIRK G. GIBBS 
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ADDENDUM 
19g£ (/ersioi« c£ . ^ AJr 
78-27-37. Definit ions. 
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means any person not im-
mune from suit who is claimed to be liable be-
cause of fault to any person seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of le-
, gal duty, act, or omission proximately causing or 
contributing to injury or damages sustained by a 
person seeking recovery, including, but not lim-
ited to, negligence in all its degrees, contributory 
negligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, 
breach of express or implied warranty of a prod-
uct, products liability, and misuse, modification 
or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any per-
son seeking damages or reimbursement on its 
own behalf, or on behalf of another for whom it is 
authorized to act as legal representative. 1986 
78-27-38. Compara t i ve negl igence. 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not 
alone bar recovery by that person. He may recover 
from any defendant or group of defendants whose 
fault exceeds his own. However, no defendant is lia-
ble to any person seeking recovery for any amount in 
excess of the proportion of fault attributable to that 
defendant. 1986 
78-27-39. S e p a r a t e special verdicts on total 
d a m a g e s and proportion of fault. 
The trial court may, and when requested by any 
party shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate 
special verdicts determining the total amount of dam-
ages sustained and the percentage or proportion of 
fault attributable to each person seeking recovery 
and to each defendant. 1986 
78-27-40. A m o u n t of liability limited to p ropor -
t ion of fault — No cont r ibut ion . 
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount 
for which a defendant may be liable to any person 
seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion of 
the damages equivalent to the percentage or propor-
tion of fault attributed to that defendant. No defen-
dant is entitled to contribution from any other per-
son. 1986 
78-27-41. J o i n d e r of de fendan t s . 
A person seeking recovery, or any defendant who is 
a party to the litigation, may join as parties any de-
fendants who may have caused or contributed to the 
injury or damage for which recovery is sought, for the 
purpose of having determined their respective propor-
tions of fault. . 1986 
78-27-42. Re lease to one de fendan t does not dis-
c h a r g e o the r de fendan t s . 
AL CODE 78-27-41 
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78-27-37. Definit ions [Effective unti l Ju ly 1, 1997]. 
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person 
immune from 3uit as defined in Subsection (3), who is 
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking 
recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, 
act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to 
injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, 
including negligence in all its degrees, contributor/ neg-
ligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of 
express or implied warranty of a product, products liabil-
ity, and misuse, modification or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person immune from suit" means: 
(a) an employer immune from suit under Title 35, 
Chapter 1 or 2; and 
(b) a governmental entity or governmental em-
ployee immune from suit pursuant to Title 63, Chap-
ter 30, Governmental Immunity Act. 
(4) "Person seeking recovery" mean3 any person seek-
ing damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on 
behalf of another for whom it 13 authorized to act as legal 
representative. 1&94 
Defin i t ions [Effective Ju ly 1, 1997]. 
As used in Sections 78-27-37 through 73-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means a person, other than a person 
immune from suit as defined in Subsection (3), who is 
claimed to be liable because of fault to any person seeking 
recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, 
act, or omission proximately causing or contributing to 
injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, 
including negligence in all its degrees, contributory neg-
ligence, assumption of risk, strict liability, breach of 
express or implied warranty of a product, products liabil-
ity, and misuse, modification, or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person immune from suit" means: 
(a) an employer immune from suit under Title 
35A, Chapter 3, Workers' Compensation Act, or Chap-
ter 3a, Utah Occupational Disease Act; and 
(b"> a governmental entity or governmental em-
ployee immune from suit pursuant to Title 63, Chap-
ter 30, Governmental Immunity Ace. 
(4) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seek-
ing damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on 
behalf of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal 
representative. 1996 
73-27-33. C o m p a r a t i v e n e g l i g e n c e . 
(1) The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone 
bar recover/ by that person. 
(2) A person seeking recover/ may recover from any defen-
dant or group of defendants whose fault, combined with the 
^ault of persons immune from suit, exceeds the fault of the 
person seeking recovery prior to anv reallocation of fault made 
under Subsection 78-27-39(2). 
(3) No defendant is liable to any person seeking recovery for 
any amount in excess of the proportion of fault at tr ibuted to 
tha t defendant under Section 78-27-39. 
('4) (a) In determining the proportionate fault at tr ibutable 
to each defendant, the fact finder may, and when re-
quested by a party shall, consider the conduct of any 
person who contributed to the alleged injury regardless of 
whether the person is a person immune from suit or a 
defendant in the action and may allocate fault to each 
person seeking recover/, to each defendant, and to any 
person immune from suit who contributed to the alleged 
injury. 
(b) Any fault allocated to a person immune from suit is 
considered only to accurately determine the fault of the 
person seeking recover/ a"d a defendant and may not 
subject the person immune from suit to any liability, 
based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action. 
1994 
78-27-39. S e p a r a t e spec ia l v e r d i c t s on total damages 
a n d p r o p o r t i o n of fault . 
(1) The trial court may, and when requested by any party 
shall, direct the jury, if any, to find separate special verdicts 
determining the total amount of damages sustained and the 
percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each person 
seeking recover', to each defendant, and to any person im-
mune from suit who contributed to the alleged injury. 
(2) (a) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault 
attributed to all persons immune from suit is less than 
40%, the trial court shall reduce that percentage or 
proportion of fault to zero and reallocate that percentage 
or proportion cf fault to the other parties in proportion to 
the percentage or proportion of fault initially attributed to 
each party by the fact finder. After this reallocation, 
cumulative fault shall equal 100% with the persons im-
mune from suit being allocated no fault. 
(b) If the combined percentage or proportion of fault 
attributed to all persons immune from suit is 40% or 
more, that percentage or proportion of fault at tr ibuted to 
persons immune from suit may not be reduced under 
Subsection (2)(a). 
(c) (i) The jury may not be advised of the effect of any 
reallocation under Subsection (2). 
(ii) The jury may be advised that fault at tr ibuted 
to persons immune from suit may reduce the award of 
the person seeking recover'. 
(3) A person immune from suit may not be held liable, 
based on the allocation of fault, in this or any other action. 
1994 
73-27-40. Amount of l iabi l i ty l imi ted to proport ion of 
fault — No contribution. 
(1) Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maxinuim amount for 
which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking 
recovery is that percentage or proportion of the damages 
equivalent to the percentage or proportion of fault attributed 
to that defendant. 
(2) A defendant is not entitled to contribution from any 
other person. 
(3) A defendant or person seeking recovery may not bring a 
civil action against any person immune from suit to recover 
damages resulting from the allocation of fault under Section 
73-27-38. 1394 
7S-27-41. Jo inder of d e f e n d a n t s . 
(1) A person seeking recover/, or any defendant who i3 a 
party to the litigation, may join as a defendant, in accordance 
with the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, any person other than 
a person immune from suit who may have caused or contrib-
uted to the injurvr or damage for which recover/ is sought, for 
78-27-42 t. -JDICIAL CODE 
the purpose of having determined their respective proportions 
of fault. 
(2) A person immune from suit may not be named as a 
defendant, but fault may be allocated to a person immune 
from suit solely for the purpose of accurately determining the 
fault of the person seeking recovery and a defendant. A person 
immune from suit is not subject to any liability, based on the 
allocation of fault, in this or any other action. 
(3) (a) A person immune from suit may intervene as a 
party under Rule 24, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
regardless of whether or not money damages are sought. 
(b) A person immune from suit who intervenes in an 
action may not be held liable for any fault allocated to that 
person under Section 78-27-38. 19&4 
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On this (-/ day of September, 1997, I deposited a true 
: r r--- - • ' i • f ' " r ^  a< • i B r i e f < \ o p e l 1 e e s P a u l H . 
Shaphren and Parsons & Crowther in the United States Mail, postage 
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prepa 
Max D. Wheeler, Esq. 
Stanley J. Preston, Esq. 
Richard A. Van Wagoner, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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